Although increased automation has made it easier to control aircraft, ensuring a safe interaction between the pilots and the autopilots is still a challenging problem, especially in the presence of severe anomalies. Current approach consists of autopilot solutions that disengage themselves when they become ineffective. This may cause reengagement of the pilot at the worst possible time, which can result in undesired consequences. In this paper, a series of research studies that propose pilot-autopilot interaction schemes based on the Capacity for Maneuver (CfM) concept, are covered. CfM refers to the remaining capacity of the actuators that can be used for bringing the aircraft to safety. It is demonstrated that CfM-based pilot-autopilot interaction schemes, or Shared Control Architectures (SCA), can be promising alternatives to the existing schemes. Two SCAs are tested in the experiments. In SCA1, the pilot takes over the control from the autopilot using the monitored CfM information. In SCA2, the pilot takes on the role of a supervisor helping the autopilot whenever a need arises, based on the CfM information. Whenever the aircraft experiences a severe anomaly, the pilot assesses the situation based on his/her CfM monitoring and intervenes by providing two control system parameter estimates to the autopilot. This increases the effectiveness of the autopilot. Using human-in-the-loop simulations, it is shown that CfM based interactions provides smaller tracking errors and larger overall CfM. The subjects including a commercial airline pilot and several university students are trained using a systematic procedure. Creation of new cyber physical & human systems is inevitable along with deeper engagement with the social science community so as to get better insight into human decision making. The results reported here should be viewed as a first of several steps in this research direction.
as the ability to adapt online in the presence of various uncertainties and anomalies is the hallmark of an autonomous system. In order to design such a system, a variety of challenges needs to be addressed. Uncertainties may occur in several forms, both structured and unstructured. Anomalies may often be severe that requires rapid detection and swift action to minimize damage and restore normalcy. This paper addresses the difficult task of making autonomous decisions in the presence of severe anomalies. While the specific application we focus on is flight control, the overall solutions we propose are applicable for general complex dynamic systems.
The domain of decision making is common to both human experts and feedback control systems. Human experts routinely make several decisions when faced with anomalous situations. In the specific context of flight control systems, pilots often take several decisions based on the sensory information from the cockpit, situational awareness, their expert knowledge of the aircraft, and ensure a safe performance. All autopilots in a fly-by-wire aircraft are programmed to provide the appropriate corrective input to ensure that the requisite variables follow the specified guidance commands accurately. Advanced autopilots ensure that such a command following occurs even in the presence of uncertainties and anomalies. However, the process of assembling various information that may help detect the anomaly may vary between the pilot and the autopilot. Once the anomaly is detected, the process of mitigating the impact of the anomaly may also differ between the pilot and autopilot. Nature of perception, speed of response, intrinsic latencies may all vary significantly between the two decision makers. It may be argued that perception and detection of the anomaly may be carried out efficiently by the human pilot whereas fast action following a command specification may be best accomplished by an autopilot. Our thesis in this paper is that a shared control architecture where the decision making of the human pilot is judiciously combined with that of an advanced autopilot is highly attractive in flight control problems where severe anomalies are present.
There are different kinds of shared control architectures (SCA) proposed in the literature. One of these SCAs is haptic shared control (HSC), which has applications both in the aerospace [1, 2] and in automotive [3] domains. In HSC, both the automation and the human operator exert forces on a common control interface, such as a steering wheel or a joystick, to achieve their individual goals. In [1] and [2] the goal of the haptic feedback is to help a UAV operator avoid an obstacle. In the case of [3] , one of the goals is lane-keeping. Both approaches provide situational awareness to the human operator and in both of the cases the human has the ability to override the haptic feedback from the autopilot by exerting more force to the control interface. Another SCA approach is to enable the automation to affect the control input directly instead of using a common interface [4] . In this approach, the human operator can override the automation by disengaging it from the control system. In these methods, severe anomalies are not assumed to be present.
One solution for a bumpless transfer between the pilot and autopilot is to provide situational awareness to the pilots via a more informative pilot display [5] . It is argued in [5] that a common problem in pilot-automation interaction is the unawareness of the pilot of the automation state and the aircraft during the flight, which makes the automation system opaque to the pilot, prompting the use of such a pilot display. The employment of the display is discussed in [5] , in the presence of automation developed in [6, 7] that provides flight envelope protection together with a loss of control logic. A review of recent advances on human-machine interaction can be found [8] , where the focus is on adaptive automation, in which the automation monitors the human pilot to adjust itself accordingly.
Recently, a series of studies is conducted proposing SCAs for the coordination of pilot-autopilot interactions, with an emphasis on resilient control in the presence of severe and unexpected anomalies [9, 10, 11, 12] . In [9] , switching of the control authority from the autopilot to the pilot is realized on the basis of Capacity for Maneuver (CfM) concept, where keeping a reasonable maneuverability capability, by preventing actuator saturation, is prioritized over performance. The CfM concept is also used in [10] and [11] , where the pilot provides supervisory support to the autopilot as a way to address severe flight anomalies. Similarly, in the SCA structure proposed in [12] , the pilot provides higher level decision support to the autopilot, but in this work, instead of CfM information, control loop lags are employed for decision making.
In this paper, we present the research conducted in [9, 10, 11, 12] in an aggregate manner for a larger control audience, and take the research one step further. (See Figure 1 for a schematic of the SCAs proposed in [9] [10] [11] [12] ). The control architectures that are presented in the papers [9, 10, 11] are validated using human-in-the-loop simulations. These humans include an airline pilot, who is also a flight instructor, with 2600 hours of flight experience, as well as human subjects who were trained in a systematic manner by the experiment designer. The details of the training is explained in the Section "Validation with Human in the Loop Simulations". It is shown that the shared control architectures in [9] , [10] and [11] indeed lead to better performance as conjectured therein under a certain task carried out by the human. The resulting solution therefore is an embodiment of an efficient cyber-physical human system, a topic that is of significant interest of late [12] .
In both [9] and [10] , two distinct shared control architectures are presented. In [9] , the assumption is that the autopilot is designed to accommodate satisfactory operation under nominal conditions, with the requisite tracking performance. An anomaly is assumed to occur in the form of loss of effectiveness of the actuator (which may be due to a damage to the control surfaces caused by a sudden change in environmental conditions or a compromised engine due to bird strikes). The shared control solution proposed in [9] is for the pilot to step in and take over from the autopilot. A well known model of the pilot in [13] , [14] , [15] is utilized to simulate the stick movements of a pilot, and a specific sequence of control actions that corresponds to perception of the anomaly followed by a decision to take over control from the autopilot is assumed to be taken by the pilot. It is shown through simulation studies that when the pilot carries out this sequence of perception and adaptation tasks, the effect of anomaly is contained, and the tracking performance is maintained at a satisfactory level. In contrast to such a shared control architecture, which can be summarized as a "autopilot-anomaly occurs-pilot takes over" sequence, in [10] , the autopilot is assumed to be more advanced. Unlike [9] , where the autopilot action was assumed to be based on a simple PD controller, in [10] , the autopilot is assumed to be based on an adaptive state-feedback controller. Therefore, rather than taking over the stick control from the autopilot, the pilot is assumed to play a supervisory role, by providing key parameters to the autopilot that indicate the presence of an anomaly. These parameters are then judiciously utilized by the autopilot to adapt its control architecture and contain the effects of the anomaly. represents the SCA2, in which the pilot undertakes a supervisory role. CfM values approaching to dangerously small numbers may trigger the pilot to assess the situation and convey necessary auxiliary inputs µ andΛ fp to the autopilot. (c) represents SCA 3, which is also based on the supervisory role of the pilot, in which the pilot surveils the latencies in control loops and switches between different autopilots accordingly.
The architectures proposed in [16, 17, 18] are inspired by principles from cognitive engineering that studies how humans add resilience to complex systems. The first principle is Capacity for Maneuver (CfM), which denotes a system's reserve capacity that will remain after the occurrence of an anomaly [17] . It is hypothesized that resiliency is rooted in and achieved via monitoring and regulation of the system's CfM [18] . It should be noted that an equivalent notion of CfM can be identified in an engineering context, which is the reserve capacity of an actuator. Viewing the actuator input power as the system's capacity, and noting that a fundamental capacity limit exists in all actuators in the form of magnitude saturation, one can define CfM for an autopilot-controlled system as the distance between the control input and saturation limits. The need to avoid actuator saturation, and therefore increasing CfM, becomes even more urgent in the face of anomalies which may push the actuators to their limits. This implies that there is a common link between a pilot-based decision making with that of an autopilot-based one in the form of a CfM. The pilot is assumed to be capable of monitoring CfM, and using it to assess the alert level of a system when subjected to anomaly and suitably directing its performance. The autopilot is associated with a CfM that can be used as a design tool to ensure quick performance when alerted by the pilot. In the first paper, it is assumed that the pilot continuously monitors a particular metric related to CfM of the actuator, and when it exceeds a certain threshold, takes over control.
In [11] , as previously mentioned, the pilot is assumed to provide a key parameter µ based on the perceived anomaly. This parameter is assumed to depend not only on CfM but another concept, denoted as Graceful Command Degradation (GCD). GCD is proposed as an inherent metric adopted by humans [16] that will allow the underlying system to function so as to retain a target CfM. As the name connotes, GCD corresponds to the extent to which the system is allowed to relax its performance goals. When compromised, it is reasonable to impose a command degradation; greater this degradation, larger the reserves that the system will possess when recovered from the anomaly. A GCD can then be viewed as a control variable that is tuned so as to permit a system to reach its targeted CfM. The role of tuning this variable so that the desired CfM is retained by the system is relegated to the pilot in [10] . In particular a parameter µ is transferred to the autopilot from the autopilot, which is shown to result in an ideal trade-off between the CfM and GCD by the overall closed-loop system with the shared control architecture. In both papers, the hypothesis that the proposed shared control architecture between human pilots and autopilots results in an improved performance is validated through numerical results with high fidelity models of an aircraft.
The above discussions indicate that the results obtained in [9, 10, 11] is predicated on the assumption that a pilot is capable of playing the roles described above. In particular, we have made an assumption in [9] that the pilot is able to monitor CfM and determine a threshold that indicates the need to switch controls from the autopilot to the pilot. In [11] , we assume that the pilot is able to assess a parameter µ that corresponds to the desired tradeoff between CfM and GCD. In this paper, we carry out human-in-the-loop experiments with trained subjects performing the pilot actions and validate the roles proposed in our shared control architectures in [9] , [10] and [11] . It should be noted that tha SCA in [12] is briefly discussed in section "Shared Control" but its validation is relegated to future work.
In the following sections, to provide a smooth exposition of SCAs discussed above, we first introduce the two main components of these SCAs, namely the autopilot and the human pilot, in two separate sections: In the "Autopilot" section, we provide the details of the employed controllers. In the "Human Pilot" section, we first review main mathematical models of pilots proposed in the literature, in the absence of a severe anomaly. Then, we present the human model used in the development of the proposed SCAs. We later present the working principles of these SCAs in detail, in section "Shared Control". Finally, in the "Validation with Human in the Loop Simulations" section, we show how the underlying ideas are tested with human subjects.
Autopilot
In this section, we describe the technical details related to the autopilot discussed in [9] and [11] .
Dynamic Model of the Aircraft
Since the autopilot in [11] is assumed to be determined using feedback control, the starting point is the description of the aircraft model, which has the formẋ
where x ∈ R n and u ∈ R m are deviations around a trim condition in aircraft states and control input, respectively, d represents uncertainties associated with the trim condition, and the last term Φ T f (x) represents higher order effects due to nonlinearities. A is a (n × n) system matrix and B is a (n × m) input matrix, both of which are assumed to be known, with (A, B) controllable, and Λ f is a diagonal matrix that reflects a possible actuator anomaly with unknown positive entries λ fi . It is assumed that the anomalies occur at time t a , so that λ fi = 1 for 0 ≤ t < t a , and λ fi switches to a value that lies between 0 and 1 for t > t a . It is finally postulated that the higher order effects are such that f (x) is a known vector that can be determined at each instant of time, while Φ is an unknown vector parameter. Such a dynamic model is often used in flight control problems [19] .
A particularly simple version of the plant in (1) corresponds to the control of pitch-rate of an aircraft [9] , whose dynamics can be captured in the form of a transfer function between the aileron deflection u and the pitch rate y in the form of
Using these models in (1) and (2), we describe the autopilots in [9] and [11] .
Any physical system is subjected to constraints, and actuators in aircraft which are the agencies that are responsible for generating control inputs are not exceptions to this rule either. As the focus of this paper is the design of a control architecture in the context of anomalies, we explicitly accommodate actuator constraints. In particular, we assume that the u is assumed to be position / amplitude limited and modelled as
where u maxi for i = 1, . . . , m are the physical amplitude limits of actuator i, and u ci (t) are the control inputs to be determined by the shared control architecture (SCA). The functions sat(·) and sgn(·) denote saturation and sign functions, respectively.
Autopilot based on PD control
Assuming a single control input only, the goal is to determine u using a PD control input [9] . Noting that the transfer function between an input u and an output M (t) is given by (2), a PD controller can be chosen as
where M cmd is the desired command signal that M is required to follow. Given the second-order structure of the aircraft dynamics, it is easy to show that suitable gains K p and K r can be determined so that the closed-loop system is stable and for command inputs at low frequencies, a satisfactory tracking performance can be obtained.
Advanced autopilot based on adaptive control
The control input u ci (t) will be constructed using an adaptive controller. To specify the adaptive controller, a reference model that specifies the commanded behavior from the plant is constructed and is of the form [20] 
where r 0 ∈ R k is a reference input, A m (n × n) is a Hurwitz matrix, x m ∈ R n is the state of the reference model and (A m , B m ) is controllable. The goal of the adaptive autopilot is then to choose u ci (t) in (7) so that if an error e is defined as
all signals in the adaptive system remain bounded with error e(t) tending to zero asymptotically.
The design of adaptive controllers in the presence of control magnitude constraints is first addressed in [21] , with guarantees of closed-loop stability through modification of the error used for the adaptive law. The same problem is addressed in [22] , using an approach termed µ-mod adaptive control where the effect of input saturation is accommodated through the addition of another term in the reference model. Yet another approach based on a closed-loop reference model (CRM) is derived in [23] , [24] in order to improve the transient performance of the adaptive controller. The autopilot we propose in this paper is based on both the µ-mod and CRM approaches. Using the control input modified in (3), this controller is compactly summarized as
where
A buffer region in the control input domain
is implied by (7) and (9) and the choice of µ allows the input to be scaled somewhere in between. The reference model is also modified aṡ
and L < 0 is a constant or a matrix selected such that (A m + L) is Hurwitz. Finally, the adaptive parameters are adjusted asK
where P = P T is a solution of the Lyapunov equation (for Q > 0)
The stability of the overall adaptive system specified by (1) , (3), (5)- (13) is established in [22] when L = 0. The stability of the adaptive system, when no saturation inputs are present, is also established in [24] . A very straightforward combination of the two proofs can be easily carried out to prove that when L < 0 the adaptive system considered in this paper has globally bounded solutions if the plant in (1) is open-loop stable and bounded solutions for an arbitrary plant if all initial conditions and the control parameters in (12) lie in a compact set. The proof is skipped due to page limitations.
The adaptive autopilot in (7)- (13) provides the required control input, u, in (1) as a solution to the underlying problem. The autopilot includes several free parameters including µ in (7), δ in (9), the reference model parameters A m , B m , L in (10) and the control parameters (12) . As will be seen in the next section, the parameters δ and µ are related to CfM and GCD.
Quantification of CfM, GCD and Trade-offs
The control input u ci in (7) is shaped by two parameters δ and µ, both of which help tune the control input with respect to its specified magnitude limit u maxi . We use these two parameters in quantifying CfM, GCD, and the trade-offs between them as follows.
• CfM: As mentioned in the introduction, qualitatively, CfM corresponds to a system's reserved capacity, which we quantitatively formulate in the current context as the distance between a control input and its saturation limits. In particular, we define CfM as
c i (t) is the normalized CfM variation of actuator i, CfM R is the root mean squared CfM variation and CfM d , which denotes the desired CfM is chosen as
In the above equations, min and max are the minimum and maximum operators over the i th index, rms is the root mean square operator and t a and T refer to the time of anomaly and final simulation time, respectively. From (15), we note that (i) CfM R has a maximum value u max for the trivial case when all u i (t) = 0, (ii) a value close to δu max if the control inputs approach the buffer region, and (iii) zero if u i (t) hits the saturation limit u max . Since CfM d = δu max , it follows that CfM, the corresponding normalized value, is greater than unity when the control inputs are small and far away from saturation, unity as they approach the buffer region, and zero when fully saturated. The buffer region [(1 − δ)u maxi , u maxi ] that |u i (t)| belongs to can be mapped into the CfM domain as a virtual buffer [0, δ] by substituting the upper and lower limit u max and u δ max into |u i (t)| in (15).
• GCD: As mentioned earlier, the reference model represents the commanded behavior from the plant being controlled. In order to reflect the fact that the actual output may be compromised if the input is constrained, we add a term that depends on ∆u ad (t) in (11) to become nonzero whenever the control input saturates, that is, when the control input approaches the saturation limit, ∆u adi becomes nonzero, thereby suitably allowing a graceful degradation of x m from its nominal choice as in (10) . We denote this degradation as GCD and quantify it as:
where T 0 denotes the interval of interest. It should be noted that once µ is specified, the adaptive controller automatically scales the input into the reference model through ∆u ad and K u , in a way so that e(t) remains small and the closed-loop system has bounded solutions.
• µ: The intent behind the introduction of the parameter µ in (7) is to regulate the control input and move it away from saturation when needed. For example, if |u adi (t)| > u δ maxi , the extreme case of µ = 0 will simply set u ci = u ad , thereby removing the effect of the virtual limit imposed in (9) . As µ increases, the control input would decrease in magnitude and move towards the virtual saturation limit u δ maxi , that is, once the buffer δ is determined, µ controls u i (t) within the buffer region [(1 − δ)u maxi , u maxi ], bringing it closer to the lower limit with increasing µ. In other words, as µ increases, CfM increases as well in the buffer region.
It is easy to see from (10) and (11) that similar to CfM, as µ increases, GCD increases as well. This is due to the fact that an increase in µ increases ∆u adi (t) which, in turn, increases the GCD. While a larger CfM improves the responsiveness of the system to future anomalies, a lower bound on the reference command is necessary to finish the mission within practical constraints. In other words, µ needs to be chosen so that GCD remains above a lower limit while maintaining a large CfM. We relegate the task of selecting the appropriate µ to the human pilot.
Choice of the Reference Model Parameters
In addition to µ and δ, the adaptive controller in (3), (5)- (13) requires the reference model parameters A m , B m , L and the control parameters K x (0), K r (0), and K u (0) at time t = 0. If no anomalies are present, then Λ nom = Λ f = I which implies that A m and B m as well as the control parameters can be chosen as
where K x (0) is computed using a linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) method and the nominal plant parameters (A, B) [25] and K r (0) in (18) is selected to provide unity low frequency DC gain for the closed-loop system. When anomalies occur, Λ f = I, at time t = t a and supposing that an estimateΛ f is available, a similar choice as in (18) can be carried out using the plant parameters (A, BΛ f ) and the relations
with the adaptive controller specified using (3)-(13) for all t ≥ t a . Finally, L is chosen as in [24] and lower parameterŝ d(0),Φ(0) are chosen arbitrarily. Similar to µ, we relegate the task of assessing the estimateΛ fp to the human pilot as well.
Human Pilot
In this section, we discuss mathematical models of human pilot decision making on the basis of absence and presence of flight anomalies. A great deal of research has been conducted on mathematical human pilot modeling assuming that no failure in the aircraft or no severe disturbances in the environment are present. Since decision making will differ significantly whether the aircraft is under nominal operation or subjected to severe anomalies, the corresponding models are entirely different as well and are discussed separately in what follows.
Pilot Models in the Absence of Anomaly
In the absence of anomalous event(s), the mathematical models of human pilot control behavior can fundamentally be assorted according to control-theoretic, physiological and, more recently, machine learning methods [26] , [27] . One of the most renowned control-theoretic method in the modelling of human pilot, namely, the crossover model, is presented in [28] as an assembly of the pilot and the controlled vehicle, for single loop control systems. The open loop transfer function for the crossover model is
where Y h (jω) is a transfer function of the human pilot, Y p (jω) is a transfer function of the aircraft, ω c is the crossover frequency and τ e is the effective time delay pertinent to the system delays and human pilot lags. The crossover model is applicable for a range of frequencies around the crossover frequency, ω c . When a "remnant" signal is introduced to Y h (jω) to account for the nonlinear effects of the pilot-vehicle system, the model is called a quasi-linear model [29] .
Other sophisticated quasi-linear models can be found in the literature as the extended crossover model [29] , which works especially for conditionally stable systems, that is, when a pilot attempts to stabilize an unstable transfer function of the controlled element, Y p (jω), and the precision model [29] , which treats a wider frequency region than the crossover model. The single loop control tasks are covered by quasi-linear models. They can be extended to multiloop control tasks by the introduction of the optimal control model [30] , [31] . This model enables the controlled elements to be given in state space representation provided that a well-trained pilot controls the aircraft in an optimal fashion.
Another approach in modelling the human pilot is employing the information of sensory dynamics relevant to humans to extract the effect of motion, proprioceptive, vestibular and visual cues on the control effort. An example of this is the descriptive model [32] in which a series of experiments are conducted to distinguish the influence of vestibular and visual stimuli from the control behavior. Another example can be given as the revised structural model [33] where the human pilot is modeled as the unification of proprioceptive, vestibular and visual feedback paths. It is hypothesized that such cues help alleviate the compensatory control action taken by the human pilot.
It is noted that due to their physical limitations models such as in (20) are valid for operation in a predefined boundary or envelope where the environmental factors are steady and stable. In the case of an anomaly, they may not perform as expected [34] .
Pilot Models in the Presence of Anomaly
When extreme events and failures occur, human pilots are known to adapt themselves to changing environmental conditions, which overstep the boundaries of automated systems. Since the hallmark of any autonomous system its ability to self-govern even under emergency conditions, modeling of the pilot decision-making upon occurrence of an anomaly is indispensable, and examples are present in the literature [13, 14, 15, 11, 12] . In this paper, we assume that the anomalies can be modeled either as an abrupt change in the vehicle dynamics [13, 14, 15, 12] , or a loss of control effectiveness in the control input [11] . In either case, the objective is the modeling of the decision making of the pilot so as to elicit a resilient performance from the aircraft and recover rapidly from the impact of the anomaly.
Pilot Models Based on Capacity for Maneuver (CfM)
A recent method in modelling of human pilot under anomalous events utilizes the Capacity for Maneuver (CfM) concept [9] , [10] , [11] . As discussed in the "Autopilot" section, CfM refers to the remaining range of the actuators before saturation, which quantifies the available maneuvering capacity of the vehicle. It is hypothesized that surveillance and regulation of a system's available capacity to respond to all events help maintain the resiliency of a system, which is a necessary merit to recover from unexpected and abrupt failures or disturbances [18] . We propose two different types of pilot models, both of which use CfM, but in different ways.
• Perception trigger: Here, the pilot model is assumed to assess the CfM and implicitly compute a perception gain based on the CfM. The quantification of this gain, K t , is predicated on CfM R with the definition as in (15) . The perception trigger is associated to the gain K t , which is implicitly computed as in [9] . The perception algorithm for the pilot is
and
G 1 (s) is a second order filter introduced as a smoothing and lagging operator into human perception algorithm, F (t) is the perception variable, µ p is the average of
, both of which are measured over a nominal flight simulation. The computation of these statistical parameters is further elaborated in subsection "Validation of Shared Control Architecture 1". The hypothesis here is that the human pilot has such a perception trigger, K t , and when this trigger, K t = 1, the pilot takes over control from the autopilot. In Section "Validation of Shared Control Architecure 1", we validate this perception model.
• CfM-GCD Tradeoff : Here, the pilot is assumed to implicitly assess the available (normalized) CfM when an anomaly occurs, and decide on the amount of GCD that is allowable so as to let the CfM become comparable to the CfM d . In other words, we assume that the pilot is capable of assessing the parameter µ and input this value to the autopilot following the occurrence of an anomaly. In Section "Validation of Shared Control Architecture 2", we validate this assessment.
Shared Control
The focus of this paper is on a shared control architecture that combines the decision making of a pilot and autopilot in flight control. The architecture is invoked under alert conditions, with triggers in place that specify when the decision-making is transferred from one authority to another. The specific alert conditions that we focus on in this paper corresponds to physical anomalies that compromise the actuator effectiveness. The typical roles of the autopilot and the pilot in a flight control problem were described in Sections "Autopilot" and "Human Pilot" respectively. In Section "Autopilot", autopilots based on PD control and adaptive control were described, with former designed to ensure satisfactory command following under nominal conditions, and the latter to accommodate parametric uncertainties including loss of control effectiveness in the actuators. In Section "Pilot Models in the Presence of Anomaly", two different models of decision making in pilots were proposed, both based on the monitoring of CfM of the actuators.
In this section, we propose three different shared control architectures, using the models of the autopilots and pilots described in the previous sections.
Shared Control Architecture 1: A pilot with a CfM based perception and a fixed-gain autopilot
The first shared control architecture can be summarized as a sequence {autopilot runs, anomaly occurs, pilot takes over}. That is, it is assumed that an autopilot based on PD control as in (4) is in place, ensuring a satisfactory command tracking under nominal conditions. The human pilot is assumed to consist of a perception component and an adaptation component. The perception component consists of monitoring CfM R , through which a perception trigger F 0 is calculated using (22) and (23) . The adaptation component consists of monitoring the control gain in (21) , and taking over control of the aircraft when K t = 1. The details of this shared controller and its evaluation using a numerical simulation study can be found in [9] . Figure 2 illustrates the schematic of SCA1. Figure 2 : Block diagram of the shared control architecture 1 (adapted from [9] ). The autopilot model consists of a fixed gain controller, whereas the human pilot model comprehends a perception part based on Capacity for Maneuver (CfM) concept and an adaptation part governed by empirical adaptive laws [15] . The block G nm (s) refers to a simple model of neuromuscular dynamics of a pilot [35] . The neuromuscular transfer function, G nm (s), which corresponds to control input formed by an arm or leg is given as G nm (s) = 100 s 2 +14.14s+100 . When an anomaly occurs, the plant dynamics, Y c (s), undergoes an abrupt change by rendering the autopilot insufficient for the rest of the control. At this stage, the occurrence of an anomaly is captured by the CfM such that the control is handed over to the human pilot model for a resilient flight control.
Shared Control Architecture 2: A pilot with a CfM-based decision making and an advanced adaptive autopilot
In this shared control architecture, we reduce the role of the pilot to a supervisory one and increase the role and complexity of the autopilot. The pilot is assumed to monitor the CfM of the resident actuators in the aircraft following an anomaly. In an effort to degrade the command so as to allow the CfM to stay close to the CfM d in (16), the pilot then determines a parameter µ which directly scales the control effort through (7) and indirectly scales the command signal through (10) and (11). Once µ is specified by the pilot, then the adaptive autopilot continues to supply the control input using (7)- (13) . If the pilot has high situational awareness, he/she provides Λ fp as well, which is an estimate of the severity of the anomaly. The details of this shared controller and its evaluation using a numerical simulation study can be found in [10] , [11] . Figure 3 shows the schematic of SCA2.
Human Pilot
Adaptive Laws (8), (12) , (13) CfM (14), (15) 
Shared Control Architecture 3: A pilot with a latency-based decision making and an advanced adaptive autopilot
The structure of SCA 3 is fairly similar to that of SCA2 except in the specific parameters that the pilot chooses to monitor as well as transmits to the autopilot. The autopilot is based on an adaptive controller as well, though different from that in (7)- (13) . Rather than utilization of CfM to monitor the alert status of the aircraft, the intrinsic latency in the aircraft response to control inputs is proposed to be monitored by the pilot. This information is then used by the pilot to map into a parameter n * that is transmitted to the autopilot. The autopilot in turn uses this parameter to switch to a specific adaptive controller whose order, number of adjustable parameters, and overall structure are suitably chosen. The details of this shared controller and its evaluation using a numerical simulation study can be found in [12] .
We restrict our attention to the validation of SCA1 and SCA2 in the following section while that of SCA 3 is relegated to future work.
Validation with Human In the Loop Simulations
The two SCAs we presented in the earlier section correspond to a human pilot working together with an autopilot in order to combat the effects of an anomaly. In SCA1, we hypothesize a human pilot model in the form of (21)- (23), and propose that when an anomaly occurs, the pilot monitors the perception trigger K t and when it becomes unity, takes over the helm from the autopilot and ensures a safe performance. In SCA2, an advanced adaptive-control based autopilot is assumed to be in effect, and the pilot is hypothesized to monitor the CfM and input a key parameter µ to the autopilot. The autopilot in turn leads the closed-loop system to a safe performance with this key input. The goal in this section is to validate the two hypotheses of the human-pilot actions. Despite the presence of obvious common elements to the two SCAs, of a human pilot, an autopilot, and a shared controller that combines their decision making, all of the details differ significantly. We therefore describe the validation of these two hypotheses separately in what follows. In each case, we present the validation in the following order: the experimental setup, the type of anomaly, the experimental procedure, details of the human subjects, the pilot-model parameters, results and observations. Figure 5 ) and a commercially available pilot joystick, whose pitch input is used. SCA2 experiment consists of a different pilot screen (see Figure 9 ) and the joystick. In SCA2, subjects use the joystick lever to provide input.
Validation of Shared Control Architecture 1

Experimental Setup
The experimental setup consists of a pilot screen and the commercially available pilot joystick Logitech Extreme 3D Pro (see Figure 4 -(a)) with the goal of performing a desktop, human-in-the-loop, simulation. The flight screen interface for the Shared Control Architecture 1 is illustrated in Figure 5 . The orange line with a circle in the middle shows the reference to be followed by the pilot. This line is moved up and down according to the desired reference command, M cmd (see Figure 2) . The blue sphere in Figure 5 represents the nose tip of the aircraft and is driven by the joystick inputs. When the subject moves the joystick, s/he provides the control input, v, which goes through the aircraft model and produces the movement of the blue sphere. The control objective is to keep the blue sphere inside the orange circle, which translates into tracking the reference command. The blue sphere represents the aircraft nose and is controlled in the vertical direction via joystick movements. The orange line with a circle in the middle, which also moves in the vertical direction, represents the reference command to be followed. The control objective is to keep the blue sphere inside the orange circle. At the beginning of the experiments, the aircraft is controlled by the autopilot. When an anomaly occurs, the subjects are warned to take over the control, via a sound signal. The time of initiating this signal is determined using different alert times.
Anomaly
The anomaly is modeled by a sudden change in vehicle dynamics, from Y before c (s) to Y after c (s) as in [15] , and illustrated in Figure 2 . Two different flight scenarios, S harsh , and S mild , are investigated, which correspond to a harsh and a mild anomaly, respectively. In the harsh anomaly, it is assumed that 
whereas in the mild anomaly, it is assumed that 
The specific numerical values of the parameters in (24) and (25) are chosen so that the pilot action has a distinct effect in the two cases based on their response time. More details of these choices are provided in the following section.
The anomaly is introduced at a certain instant of time, t a , in the experiment. The anomaly alert is conveyed as sound signal at t s , following which, the pilots take over control at a time t TRT , after a certain reaction time t RT . Denoting ∆T = t s − t a as the alert time, the total elapsed time from the onset of anomaly to the instant of hitting the joystick button is defined as
Experimental Procedure
The experimental procedure consists of three main parts, which are Pilot Briefing, Preparation Tests and Performance Tests (see Figure 6 ). Figure 6 : Experimental procedure breakdown for the Shared Control Architecture 1. Three main tasks constituting the procedure are seen. In Pilot Briefing, the subjects read the pilot briefing, review it with the experiment designer and have a question and answer session. In Preparation Tests, the subjects get familiarized with the test via demonstration runs and warm-up tests. Finally, in Performance Tests, the real tests are conducted using three different alert times.
The first part of the procedure is the Pilot Briefing, where the subjects are required to read a pilot briefing to have a clear understanding of the experiment. The briefing consists of six main sections, namely, Overall Purpose , Autopilot, Anomaly, Experimental Setup, Flight Screen and Instructions. In these sections, the main concepts and experimental hardware such as the pilot screen and the joystick lever are introduced to the subject. A scaled toy aircraft prototype is used to help the subjects visualize the concepts covered in the briefing.
The second part is the Preparation Tests, in which the subjects are introduced to a demonstration test conducted by the experiment designer to familiarize the subjects to the setup. In this test, the subjects observe the experiment designer follow a reference command using the joystick (See Figure 4(a) ). They also watch the designer to respond to control switching alert sounds by taking over the control via the joystick. Following these demonstration tests, the subjects are requested to perform the experiment themselves. To complete this part, three preparation tests, each with a duration of 90 seconds are conducted. At the end of each test, the root mean squared error, e rms , of the subjects is calculated as
and T p = 90s. It is expected that the e rms in each trial decreases as a sign of learning.
The third is the Performance Tests, each with a duration of 180 seconds, which aim at testing the performance of the proposed SCA, in terms of tracking error e rms , CfM and a bumpless transfer metric, ρ, which is calculated by taking the difference of e rms values that are obtained using the 10 second intervals before and after the anomaly. This calculation is performed as
Details of the Human Subjects
The experiment with the harsh anomaly was conducted by 15 subjects (including 1 flight pilot), whereas the one with the a mild anomaly was conducted by 3 subjects (including 1 flight pilot). All subjects were over 18 years old and 4 of the subjects were left-handed, yet this did not bring about any problems, since an ambidextrous joystick was utilized.
The experiment was approved by the Bilkent University Ethics Committee and an informed consent was taken from each subject before conducting the experiment. Some statistical data pertaining to the subjects are given in Table 1 . 
Pilot-model parameters
The pilot-model in (21)- (23) includes statistical parameters µ p and σ p , the mean and the standard deviation of the time derivative of c i (t) (defined in (15)), respectively, and the parameters of the filter G 1 (s). The filter is chosen as
s 2 +1.5s+2.25 so as to reflect the bandwidth of the pilot stick motion. To obtain the other statistical parameters, several flight simulations were run with the PD-control based autopilot in closed-loop and the resulting c i (t) values were calculated for 180s, both for the harsh and mild anomalies. The time-averaged statistics of the resulting profiles were used to calculate the statistical parameters as µ p = 0.028, σ p = 0.038 for the harsh anomaly, and µ p = 0.091, σ p = 0.077 for the mild anomaly.
The pilot model in (21)- (23) implies that the pilot signals the presence of the anomaly at the time instant when K t becomes unity, following which the control action switches from the autopilot to the human pilot. The action of the pilot based on this trigger is introduced in the experiment by choosing t s , the instant of the sound signal, to coincide with the perception trigger. The corresponding ∆T is denoted as a "CfM-based" one. In order to benchmark this CfM-based switching action, two other switching mechanisms are introduced, one which we define to be "exact", where t s = t a , so that ∆T = 0, and another to be "late", where ∆T is chosen to be significantly larger than the CfM-based one. These choices are summarized in Table 2 . Table 2 : Timeline of Anomalies. Based on of the switching mechanism, the anomaly is reported to the subject with a sound signal at t s . ∆T , the alert time, is defined as the time elapsed between the sound signal and the occurrence of anomaly. 
Results and Observations
Scenario 1: Harsh Anomaly
We present the results related to the harsh anomaly defined in (24) for various alert times transmitted to the subjects. In order to compare the results obtained from the subjects, we also carried out numerical simulation results using the same alert times. The different cases are summarized in Table 3 . The results obtained are summarized Table 4 using both the tracking error e rms and the corresponding CfM. Table 4 are averaged over all 15 subjects. e rms was calculated using (27) with T p = 180s, while CfM was calculated using (14)- (16) with u maxel = 3 and δ = 0.25. The statistical variations of both e rms and CfM over the 15 subjects are quantified for all three SCA experiments, for the late, exact, and CfM-based alert times are summarized in Table 5 . We also calculate the average bumpless transfer metric ρ and its standard error σ M (ρ) for these three cases in Table 6 . Table 6 also provides the average reaction times t RT and average total reaction times t TRT of the subjects. Table 6 : Averaged bumpless transfer metric, ρ, standard error, σ M (ρ) = σ(ρ)/ √ n, where σ is standard deviation of ρ and n is the subject size, and averaged reaction times t RT and total reaction times t TRT for S harsh . The least amount of bumpless transfer of control happens to be in the case of CfM-based shared control architecture. 
Observations
The first observation from Table 4 is that the e rms for the CfM-based case is at least 25% smaller than the case with the autopilot alone. The second observation is that among the shared control architecture experiments, the one with the CfM-based alert time has the smallest tracking error while the one with the late alert time has the largest tracking error. However, it is noted that the difference between the exact and CfM-based cases is not significant. These two observations can also be confirmed from Figure 7 , where the tracking error is shown for different types of control structures including the autopilot, the late alert time SCA, exact alert time SCA and the CfM-based alert time SCA. The figure is obtained by averaging all of the experimental results. Figure 7 : Comparison of tracking errors between the autopilot and all the alert timing mechanisms. The autopilot only case is the worst performer among all alert timing mechanisms which may be due to having predefined and fixed gains.
The third observation from Table 4 is that CfM based control switching from the autopilot to the pilot not only provides the smallest tracking error, but also the largest CfM value compared to other switching strategies. This can also be observed in Figure 8 , where CfM values, averaged over all subjects, are provided for different alert times. As noted earlier, the large CfM value of the autopilot results from inefficient use of the actuators which manifests itself with a large tracking error. The final observation, which comes from Table 6 , is that among different alert times, the one with the CfM-based alert time provides the smoothest transfer of control, with a bumpless transfer metric of ρ = 26, while the late-alert provides ρ = 216 and the exact alert gives ρ = 82.
These observations imply the following: The pilot re-engagement after an anomaly should not be delayed until it becomes too late, which corresponds to a late-alert switching strategy. At the same time, immediate pilot action right after the anomaly detection might not be necessary either, which is indicated by the fact that the bumpless transfer metric and the CfM values for the CfM-based switching case is better than the exact-switching case. Instead, monitoring the CfM information carefully may be the appropriate trigger for the pilot to take over. 
Scenario 2: Mild Anomaly
The averaged e rms (scaled by 10 4 ) and CfM values for this case are given in Table 7 . The averaged bumpless transfer metric ρ, its standard error σ M (ρ), the average reaction times t RT and the average total reaction times t TRT are presented in Table 8 . The statistical variations of these metrics over the 3 subjects are shown in Table 9 . Table 8 : Averaged bumpless transfer metric ρ; standard error σ M (ρ) = σ(ρ)/ √ n, where σ is standard deviation of ρ, and n is the subject size; averaged reaction time t RT ; and total reaction time t TRT for the experiment with a mild anomaly, S mild . The nature of the anomaly has a considerable effect on the bumpless transfer metric, that is, the difference between the exact and CfM-based alert timings is not readily noticeable as the one of the harsh anomaly. 
Observations
Similar to the harsh anomaly case, pure autopilot control results in the largest tracking error in the case of a mild anomaly. Also similar to the harsh anomaly case, pilot engagement based on CfM information produces the smallest tracking error, although the difference between the exact switching and CfM-based switching is not significant. However, in terms of preserving CfM, Table 9 shows that no significant differences between different switching times can be detected, due to wide spread (high standard error) of the results. The same conclusion can be drawn for the bumpless transfer metric, although late switching has slightly smaller metric compared to the CfM-based switching. Again, the results are close to each other due to wide-spread. One reason for this can be low sample size, 3, in this experiment. One conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that although CfM based switching shows smaller tracking errors compared to the alternatives, the advantage of the proposed SCA in the presence of mild anomaly is not as prominent as in the case of harsh anomaly.
Validation of Shared Control Architecture 2
Unlike the SCA1, where the pilot took over control from the autopilot when an anomaly occurred, in SCA2, the pilot plays more of an advisory role, directing the autopilot that remains operational throughout. In particular, the pilot provides appropriate values µ and sometimesΛ fp as well. As in the previous section, we describe the validation using the same steps, starting from the experimental setup and ending with results and observations.
Experimental Setup
The same pilot joystick (Logitech Extreme 3D Pro Joystick) used in validating SCA1 is employed for the SCA2 experiments. However, contrary to the SCA1 case, here the subjects uses the joystick only to enter the µ andΛ fp values using the joystick lever, normally used to simulate the throttle input. Joystick is not used for controlling the aircraft, since the autopilot is always in control.
The aircraft model used in these human in the loop simulations is a nonlinear F-16 model, the details of which can be found at [36] and [37] .
The flight screen that the subjects see is shown in Figure 9 . There are three subplots, which are CfM variation (top), reference command (r 0 ) tracking (middle) and the evolution of graceful command degradation (GCD) (bottom). The horizontal black line in the CfM variation subplot corresponds to the upper bound of the virtual buffer, [0, δ] = [0, 0.25]. The small rectangle at the upper right serves the purpose of showing the amount of the µ input, entered via the joystick lever. In this rectangle, the title "Anti Locking" is used to emphasize the purpose of the µ input, which is preventing the saturation/locking of the actuators. There is also another region in this rectangle called the "Range", which shows the limits of this input. The subfigure at the top shows the variation of CfM during the flight. The vertical lines at t a1 = 32s and t a2 = 68s shows the instants of anomaly introduction. The horizontal black line is the anti-locking border below which the µ input becomes effective. It is explained to the subjects, as well as demonstrated during training, that setting µ to high values where CfM variation is over this border has no influence on CfM, which is apparent from (7) . The subfigure in the middle shows reference tracking and the one in the bottom is the time variation of the graceful command degradation during flight.
In the snapshot of the pilot screen shown in Figure 9 , a scenario with two anomalies introduced at t a1 = 32s and t a2 = 68s is shown. The instant of anomaly occurrences are marked with vertical lines, the colors of which indicate the severity of the anomaly. The subjects are trained to understand and respond to the severity and the effect of the anomalies by monitoring the colors, CfM information and the tracking performance. The details of subject training are provided in the "Experimental Procedure" section.
Anomaly
The anomaly considered in this experiment is loss of actuator effectiveness indicated by Λ f in (1). Λ f is a (2 × 2) diagonal matrix with equal entries that are between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to complete actuator failure and 1 corresponds to no failure. In the experiments, two anomalies are introduced at times t = t a1 and t = t a2 . Consequently, the diagonal entries of Λ f vary as
where λ fi refers to the diagonal entries for the i th anomaly introduction. The anomaly injections are communicated to the subjects with colored vertical lines appearing on the pilot screen, as shown in Figure 9 , together with sound alerts. Three different anomalies with different severities are used during the experiments. The anomaly severity quantities, corresponding severity labels and color codes are provided in Table 10 . Table 10 : Anomaly severities. The anomalies are introduced in an audiovisual fashion, that is, the subjects perceive the anomaly by a specific sound and also have the chance to recognize it by its corresponding color. Times of anomaly injections are marked as a vertical line which appears at the instant of the anomaly, after which the subject responds by providing an appropriate µ value.
Λ f Severity Color Code Figure 10 for a schematic).
The first part of the procedure is the Pilot Briefing, in which the subjects are demanded to read a pilot briefing to acquire some prior knowledge about the experiment. The briefing consists of four main sections, namely, Overall Purpose, Flight Scenario, Flight Screen Interface and Instructions. In these sections, the main concepts and the experimental setup are covered by the experiment designer. The scaled toy aircraft prototype described in the previous experiment for SCA1 is utilized in this experiment as well, especially in conjunction with the description of control surfaces in the aircraft, since the anomalies are related to actuator failures. 
Experimental Procedure for
Real Test
Figure 10: Experimental procedure breakdown for the Shared Control Architecture 2. Three main tasks constituting the procedure are observed. In Pilot Briefing, the subjects read the pilot briefing, review it with the experiment designer and have a question and answer session. In Input Training, the subjects learn how to provide the auxiliary inputs to the autopilot using the joystick. They also undergo a µ-input training, the details of which are covered in Section "Experimental Procedure". Finally, in Performance Test, a real test with two successive anomalies Λ fi is conducted.
The second part is the Input Training, in which the subjects are first introduced to the joystick lever, which they are required to use to enter the µ input (See Figure 4) . By properly moving the lever, an integer value of µ, ranging from 1 to 20, can be given to the controller. Following this, a demonstration test is conducted by the experiment designer. In this test, a sample scenario with two anomalies is run, where the input µ is fixed to its nominal value of µ = 1, throughout the flight. It is explicitly shown that 1) the actuators reaches their saturation limit, and thus the CfM becomes zero, many times during the flight, which jeopardizes the aircraft stability, 2) it takes for the altitude, h, a long time to recover to follow the reference command, and 3) a certain graceful command degradation occurs to relax the performance goals. While running the simulation, the elements in the flight screen interface are also explained.
Following the demonstration test, another sample scenario is run by the designer, in which suitable µ values are provided upon occurrence of the anomalies. Different from the previous demonstration, it is pointed out that 1) with a proper µ, CfM can be kept away from zero and 2) GCD is kept minimal. By this demonstration, the subjects are expected to appreciate that suitable µ inputs help the autopilot recover from severe anomalies in an efficient and swift manner.
Finally, a µ-input-training is performed on the subjects. Six scenarios are introduced to the participants in an interactive manner, by which they learn how to be involved in the overall control architecture. As a first step, three scenarios with single anomalies are considered. In each severity of the anomaly, an optimal µ, which trades off CfM with GCD, is conveyed to the subjects. Upon doing this, attention is drawn to the fact that each anomaly causes a certain sharp drop in the CfM variation. In other words, more drastic drops occur in CfM with the increase in the severity of anomaly. Following this, three other scenarios with two successive anomalies are studied. It is noted by the combination of different anomalies that nonlinear effects are present in the flight simulation; that is, the µ values corresponding to single anomalies are no longer effective when the anomalies are combined.
The third part is the Performance Test, in which the subjects are expected to handle a combination of a highly severe anomalies (Λ f1 = 0.20 and Λ f2 = 0.15) in a flight simulation. They are expected to give suitable µ values on the basis of the training they obtain. It is noted that in both the training and the performance tests, the anomaly severity estimationΛ fp input is automatically fed to the controller with an error of 0.2 in absolute value. Also, in both the training and the performance tests, the introduction of anomaly times are chosen to be completely random to prevent the subjects from making a guess whether or not the anomaly is about to happen.
The set of tasks to be tackled by the subjects is summarized as a flowchart in Figure 11 . These tasks are explained interactively during the sample scenario demonstration (see Figure 10) , where the subjects have the opportunity to practise the steps in controlling the flight simulation. Figure 11 : Algorithm of pilot tasks. This presents the step-by-step procedure which should be followed by the subject.
Details of the Human Subjects
The experiment was performed by 10 subjects all of whom attended the previous experiment. This choice was made deliberately since the subjects of the previous experiment had an acquaintance with the autopilot and shared control concepts. For this reason, the pilot briefing regarding this experiment was written in a tone that the subjects were already familiar with these basic notions. The experiment was approved by the Bilkent University Ethics Committee and an informed consent was taken from each subject. Some statistical data pertaining to the subjects are given in Table 11 . Table 11 : Statistical data of the subjects in the SCA2 experiment. P is the number of participants. The µ() and the σ() operators are the average and the standard deviation operators, respectively. Scenario P F µ(Age) σ(Age)
Real Test 10 0 24.2 1.8 F: female
Results and Observations
The results with 10 subjects inputting µ into the adaptive autopilot, are shown below. The autopilots consist of an adaptive controller as in [11] , which has no apparent interface with the autopilot, a µ-mod adaptive controller with a fixed value of µ = 50, and an optimal controller. The numerical results averaged over 10 subjects are presented in Table 12 . The indices in curly brackets {h, v} denote the altitude and velocity, respectively. SAP and SUP refer to the "Situation Aware Pilot" and the "Situation Unaware Pilot", respectively. SUP provides only a µ input and SAP provides both µ andΛ fp to the autopilot. The results for the SUP are obtained by simulating the performance tests by using only the µ inputs provided by the subjects, without their severity estimation inputsΛ fp . Furthermore, the tracking performance, γ i , is calculated as In Figure 12 , a comprehensive comparison of the SCA2 with autopilot-only cases is given as a matrix of 4 × 4 plots. Each column presents the results of a specific controller whereas each row shows the comparison of these controllers based on altitude tracking h, velocity tracking V , CfM and elevator control input δ el , respectively. The horizontal dashed red line in the 3 rd row shows the buffer limit. The horizontal dashed red and green lines in the 4 th row show the limitations posed by u max and u The results given in Table 12 and Figure 12 can be summarized as follows: First, it is observed that SCA2, whether with SAP and SUP, outperforms all the other autopilot-only cases. SCA2 provides a higher tracking performance γ, a higher CfM and a lower GCD. Second, SAP shows a better performance than other controllers, including SUP, throughout the simulation run by not only showing a higher tracking performance, but also preventing CfM from reaching zero (saturation point). Third, a quick inspection of the first row of Figure 12 shows that both optimal and µ−mod autopilots fail to respond to the second anomaly. This can be explained by the fact that CfM reaches to zero (saturation point) many times, especially in the case of optimal controller. Fourth, the adaptive autopilot shows an acceptable performance up to the second anomaly, but demonstrates degraded behavior with repeated saturation. It is noted that the elevator in the case of adaptive autopilot also hits the saturation point many times and shows a more oscillatory response compared to SAP.
To emphasize the effect of anomaly estimation inputΛ fp , the performances of SCA2 with SAP and SUP are shown separately in Figure 13 . It is seen that SAP performs better than the SUP in terms of both tracking and CfM metrics. The selection of a suitable µ and the introduction of anomaly estimation, even with an error of 0.2, contribute tremendously to resilient performance, which can also be numerically verified by performance metrics given in Table 12 . Figure 13 : Comparison of the SAP and the SUP for the same scenario. The pure difference between these two pilots is based on the additional anomaly estimation inputnΛ fp . It greatly attenuates the oscillatory tracking behavior around the reference model and contributes to a fast recovery from the buffer region.
Acknowledgment
The third author would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of Boeing through the Boeing Strategic University Initiative.
